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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH D. BULLOCK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
DESERET DODGE TRUCK 
CENTER, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9193 
In this brief, the appellant will be referred to as Bullock 
and the respondent will be referred to as Deseret. 
For the purposes of this appeal, Deseret will accept the 
statement of facts recited in Bullock's brief except as 
modified herein for the purpose of needed correction and 
clarification and as amplified to include certain matters 
omitted by Bullock. 
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At the time Bullock consummated his arrangements 
with Deseret to become connected with Deseret's business 
he had been transferred to Atlanta, Georgia, by Chrysler 
and was under the necessity of moving his family from Dal-
las to Atlanta if he remained with Chrysler (Dep. 11, 12 
& 13.) 
Furthermore, prior to leaving Chrysler, Bullock had 
been transferred numerous times and was very anxious to 
settle down in one place. (Dep. 11 & 12.) 
The record shows, by Bullock's admissions, that he 
had inside information on Chrysler's plans to establish Truck 
Centers. He communicated this information to the Hinck-
leys with the principal purpose and motive in mind of 
himself becoming a part of one of Chrysler's Truck Center 
operations. The Hinckleys knew nothing about Chrysler's 
plans until they had been divulged by Bullock and it was 
Bullock, not Deseret or the Hinckleys who made the initial 
contacts out of which the relationship between the parties 
subsequently developed. Bullock was aggressively pushing 
the proposal in order to establish himself in the truck cen-
ter business in Salt Lake City, with himself as a key and 
central figure in the operation. Bullock was not enticed 
or lured by the Hinckleys from a good and satisfactory job 
with any rose-tinted or extravagant promises as to his 
future if he would leave Chrysler and join with the Hinck-
leys in the Deseret operation. Bullock was fully sold on the 
desirability of getting into a truck center operation and did 
his utmost to sell the Hinckleys on his ideas. (Dep. 13-14; 
R. 39-42.) 
The record fully and amply confirms that Bullock left 
his employment with Chrysler willingly and without per-
suasion on the part of the Hinckleys. Deseret excepts to the 
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impression sought to be created by Bullock that the Hinck-
leys gave assurances that the oral understandings of the 
parties regarding employment for an eight-year term would 
be embodied in a written document. The record shows 
that a contract was executed by the parties and that this 
agreement was the result of the mutual understanding of 
all parties concerned. Bullock fully understood what the 
agreement contained when he signed it. 
Q. ccWhen you signed the agreement you knew 
and understood what its contents were?" 
A. cci felt I did." (Dep. 6). 
Bullock himself assisted and took an active part in the 
drafting of the agreement, as demonstrated by the follow-
Ing: 
Q. ccN ow, with regard to exhibit cA', the agree-
ment was drafted two or three times before it was 
finally signed by the parties, wasn't it?'' 
A. ccAt least once, as I recall." 
Q. ccAt least once, and I suppose you read it be-
fore you signed it?" 
A. ccy es, sir." 
Q. ccAnd it embodies the terms of the agree-
ment of employment that you now rely upon?" 
A. ccYes." (Dep. 6). 
On page 2 of his brief, Bullock admits that he was 
dissatisfied with the original draft of this agreement, 
specifically the portions referring to stock options and de-
manded that it be redrafted. (R. 39-40). 
The record is clear that the provisions of this agree-
ment, such as they were, relating to employment, were 
accepted by Bullock and that he signed this agreement 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
without objections. These provisions of the contract make 
no reference to any specified term of employment. (Exh. 
((A" Para. 7). Bullock relies upon no other document in 
writing to support his contentions that he had such an agree-
ment with Deseret. (Dep. 3-6; 23). Paragraph 3 of the 
agreement provided a method by which Bullock could be-
come a participating owner in Deseret by the investment 
of his own capital in the stock of the corporation while 
employed. There is no claim that Bullock ever invested any 
money in Deseret stock. 
Deseret takes exception to Bullock's statement that he 
established a going and successful wholesale truck business 
for Deseret as a consequence of his managerial skill and 
ability. It is submitted the record falls far short of establish-
ing Bullock's successful management of Deseret. On the 
contrary, the record shows affirmatively by evasive, but none 
the less clear admissions of Bullock, that his efforts in this 
regard were not successful. (Dep. 15) . 
Finally, it is conceded by Bullock that when Deseret 
would no longer permit him to continue as manager, he 
was offered another job in the Hinckley organization, 
selling trucks and unconnected with managerial duties and 
responsibilities and with no cut in salary. Bullock declined 
to accept this offer and took another job paying less money. 
(Dep.7-8). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (TITLE 25, CHAP-
TER 5, SECTION 4 ( 1) U. C. A. 1953) BARS BULLOCK 
FROM ENFORCING THE PROVISIONS OF THE CON-
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TRACT SUED UPON WHICH RESTS UPON PAROL 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT RELIED UPON 
BY APPELLANT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS 
AND DOES NO·T REQUIRE RESORT TO EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE TO ASCERTAIN ITS MEANING. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE APPLICATIO·N 
OF THE DOCTRINE O·F PROMISSO·RY ESTOPPEL IN 
THIS CASE. 
POINT IV 
THE AGREEMENT RELIED UPO·N BY APPEL-
LANT IS NO·T SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE RE-
QUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (TITLE 25, CHAP-
TER 5, SECTION 4 (1) U. C. A. 1953) BARS BULLOCK 
FRO·M ENFORCING THE PROVISIONS O·F THE CO·N-
TRACT SUED UPON WHICH RESTS UPON PAROL 
EVIDENCE. 
The sole and only question to be determined in this ap-
peal is whether Bullock should be permitted to introduce par-
ol testimony to supply important and vital provisions of an 
alleged employment contract not expressed in writing. If 
this court agrees with the lower court that under the facts 
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of this case such is not permissible, the lower court was 
correct in granting respondent's motion for a summary· 
judgment and should be affirmed. 
It has long been the established law in this jurisdiction 
that contracts of the character involved in this case fall with-
in the provisions of the statute of frauds. 
((In the following cases, every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or mem-
orandum thereof, is in writing, subscribed by the 
party to be charged therewith: 
( 1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to 
be performed within one year from the making there-
of." (25-5-4(1) U.C.A.1953). 
The very fact that Bullock is here contending that he 
had an employment contract for an eight-year period 
brings his alleged contract within the provisions of the above 
Utah Statute. This statute has been construed in many cases 
by this .court. The rule has been uniformly adopted and 
adhered to that in order to comply with the statute the 
writing or memorandum thereof must contain every essen-
tial element of the contract or the same is void. 
In Birdzell vs. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 
242 P2, 578, it was said: 
((However, even if the letter did contain an ad-
mission, acknowledgment or recognition of the al-
leged prior oral agreement, there is another reason 
why it will not suffice as a memorandum. It is fun-
damental that the memorandum which is relied 
upon to satisfy the Statute of Frauds must contain 
all the essential terms and provisions of the contract 
::- ::- :r- As will be noted, the letter does not state what 
the amount of the rent shall be, but expressly leaves 
that question open for further negotiations. In an 
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oral contract to effect a lease for a period longer 
than one year, the amount of the rent is clearly one 
of the essential terms which must appear in the 
memorandum ':- ::- ~· ~· ." (Italics ours). 
Collett vs. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 P2 730, pre-
sented facts strikingly similar to the facts in this appeal. 
In that case the defendant filed a counterclaim alleging 
breach of an Exclusive Distributorship Contract, which was 
to run for five years and was to extend to the entire 
Uintah Basin. The existence of this contract was denied and 
because certain of the alleged terms of the agreement were 
supplied by defendant's oral testimony, the question of the 
statute of frauds was considered as to whether or not this 
testimony would be admissible. Defendant relied upon the 
minutes of a Board of Directors Meeting, at which a motion 
was presented and approved to enter into a written contract 
to give the defendant an exclusive dealership in Uintah 
County. These minutes made no mention of a dealership to 
be co-extensive with the Uintah Basin and made no pro-
vision for a five-year term. This court held that the 
agreement was within the statute of frauds and void for 
failure to state in writing all the essential terms of the 
agreement. This court said: 
HThe written memorandum which is relied upon 
to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the 
essential terms and provisions of the contract. ~· ~· ~· * 
Hawaiian Equipment Co. vs. Eimco Corp., 115 Utah 
590, 207, P2 794. * ~:- ~:- * but before the court can 
assess damages for violations of the alleged contract 
it must appear with certainty that appellant was to 
have an exclusive distributorship for the entire Uin-
tah Basin * ~· ~:- . " 
This court also said: 
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celt is elementary that compliance with the stat-
ute of frauds cannot be effected by producing a writ-
ing of some contract different from the contract on 
which the party is basing his claim. Appellant tes-
tified at the trial of this case that the exclusive dis-
tributorship granted to him by the refining company 
was to run for five years; whereas the writing on 
which he relies does not mention any time element 
whatsoever :~o ::- * * it is apparent that the agreement 
proposed in the minutes of the board of directors is 
not the same agreement appellant is attempting to 
establish in this action. For this reason the minutes 
are not a memorandum of the alleged contract." 
See also Restatement of the Law, Contracts, Section 
207, which states that one of the elements of a valid con-
tract, enforceable under the statute, shall state: 
n (c) The terms and conditions of all the prom-
ises constituting the contract and by whom and to 
whom the promises are made." 
That these principles are also applicable to contracts of 
employment is made clear by this court in Abba vs. Smith, 
21 Utah 109, 59 P 756. That case specifically dealt with an 
employment contract for three years. It was held that the 
memorandum considered by the court satisfied the require-
ments of the statute and in that case this court said: 
((Under this section unless the essential terms of 
the contract can be determined from the contract 
itself, it is within the statute of frauds, and if thus 
defective, the defect cannot be supplied by parol 
proof, for by admitting parol testimony to supply 
the essential parts of the contract, would be to re-
store the mischief which the statute of frauds was 
framed to prevent :.'- * * ." 
This opinion quotes with approval from Pomeroy on 
Contracts as follows: 
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~~The memorandum, whether consisting of one 
writing, or of several, must contain all the essential 
terms of the agreement so stated, that while parol 
evidence may, perhaps, be resorted to for the pur-
poses of identification, and to explain the situation of 
the parties and of the subject matter, it shall not be 
required to supply any substantive feature which has 
been omitted ::- :1- ):-." (Italics ours.) 
It is respectfully submitted that when a party expects 
a court of law to find that he has contractural rights en-
titling him to employment for eight years or any other 
period beyond a year and the only writing which he can pro-
duce concerning such agreement omits any reference to such 
vital period, such memorandum or contract is so lacking in 
essential and substantive terms as to be unenforceable and 
may not be supplemented by oral testimony. 
It is not urged or contended by Bullock that he has 
any other writing or agreement than the stock option agree-
ment which will supply the missing essential parts necessary 
to constitute the contract upon which he relies. 
At the outset Bullock concedes that the writing upon 
which he relies does not expressly state any specified term 
of employment. The written agreement, so far as it con-
tains any provisions relating to employment, is as follows: 
cc7. The Company agrees to employ Keith Bul-
lock as its general manager and to employ Raymond 
Hunter as its wholesale manager." (Ex. ccA"). 
Bullock's brief is a tacit admission that the statute of 
frauds applies to the agreement upon which he relies and 
his entire argument is an attempt to escape the consequences 
of the statute. 
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THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT RELIED UPON BY 
APPELLANT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND 
DOES NOT REQUIRE RESORT TO EXTRINSIC EVI-
DENCE TO ASCERTAIN ITS MEANING. 
Bullock's first proposition is that the agreement was 
drafted by Deseret's attorneys and hence the language em-
ployed in the agreement must be construed in his favor. So 
far as the record is concerned there is nothing to support 
this claim. On the ·Contrary, the record affirmatively shows 
that Bullock himself took an active and aggressive part in 
the draftsmanship of the agreement. This is true to the 
extent that he insisted upon the redrafting thereof to include 
provisions he was dissatisfied with. (Dep. 6; R. 39-40). 
Inasmuch as Bullock has gone outside the record to state 
that respondent's attorneys drafted the agreement, perhaps 
Deseret will be justified in likewise departing from the rec-
ord merely to state that Bullock attended many conferences 
in the office of the attorneys where the agreement was writ-
ten and gave instructions to the attorney concerning what 
the agreement should contain. The surrounding circum-
stances fairly establish that in the drafting of the agreement 
the attorney acted almost solely in the capacity of an 
amanuensis for all the parties, who in conference, instructed 
him regarding what the agreen1ent was to contain. Bullock's 
participation in its preparation was far from passive; when 
the final draft was complete he read and signed the agree-
ment, understanding what it contained and accepted it in 
the form in which it now appears without further change 
or objection. Furthermore, he considered it to fully embody 
the understanding of the parties. (Dep. 6). 
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In the guise of having the contract construed so as to 
include provisions which it does not contain and which 
would require the redrafting of the agreement, Bullock re-
lies upon the well-known rule that a document prepared by 
one party as an agreement between himself and another 
should, in case it contains uncertain or ambiguous language, 
be construed against the party who wrote or had it written. 
The fallacy in Bullock's proposition is not that the rule 
which he cites is incorrect; this rule is well understood by all 
courts, but it can have no application to this case, because 
the language of the agreement is neither doubtful nor am-
biguous. Furthermore, even if a document is so far am-
biguous as to permit application of the rule, no case goes 
so far as to hold that language may be imported into it 
which it does not contain under the claim that that which 
is missing constitutes ambiguity. 
An agreement is not construed against the party who 
prepared it, ipso facto, because such party wrote it or had 
it written, but only if its meaning is doubtful and it is 
susceptible of more than one meaning. As stated by this 
court in Bryant vs. Deseret News Publishing Comp.any, 120 
Utah 241, 233 P2 355, the rule is stated thus: 
(():- * * plaintiff also invokes the rule of inter-
pretation that doubtful and ambiguous terms in a 
contract should be interpreted against the party who 
has chosen its terms ):- ~· ::- we agree that this rule of 
construction should be considered in determining 
what is a reasonable and fair interpretation of the 
intention of the parties. However, if the language 
is clear and is not susceptible of more than one in-
terpretation, the ordinary plain meaning of the words 
must be used.'' 
The very cases cited by counsel state this rule clearly. 
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Thus, in Huber & Roland Construction Co. vs. City of South 
Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2 273, 323 P2 558, this court said: 
H* ~- :-.. Doubtful or ambiguous portions of a con-
tract should be construed against the party who draws 
it. (Italics ours). 
In Continental Bank & Trust Company vs. Bybee, 6 
Utah 2 98 306 P2 773, this court announced the rule in 
this language: 
H :-.- ~- ~- the intent should be ascertained first 
from the four corners of the instrument itself, second 
from other contemporaneous writings and third from 
the extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions ~- * * 
if the ambiguity can be reconciled from a reasonable 
interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence 
should not be allowed ~- * ~-." 
Again, in Penn Star Mining Company vs. Lyman, 64 
Utah 343, 231 P 107, it was stated: 
((There is still another element to which the 
courts under certain circumstances, have recourse, 
in case the language in a contract is ambiguous o-r 
uncertain, which is that, where one of the parties, or 
one who is directly interested in the subject matter 
of the contract, has prepared it and has used lan-
guage which is ambiguous or uncertain in its mean-
ing, the language will be construed most strongly 
against the party who has used the ambiguous or un-
certain language * ::- ~ ... " (Italics ours). 
The case of Universal Underwriters Insurance Com-
pany vs. Bush, CCA10 272 Fed. 2, 675, was a case in-
volving consideration of the language of an insurance con-
tract and certain claimed ambiguities which it contained in 
which the insured was contending the language should be 
construed in his favor. In its opinion, that court quotes 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
from Bergholm vs. Peoria. Life Insurance Company, 284, 
U. S. 489, 76 Law Ed. 416, as follows: 
nit is true that where the terms of a policy are 
of doubtful meaning, construction most favorable to 
the insured will be adopted :~o * *. This canon of 
construction is both reasonable and just, since the 
words of the policy are chosen by the insurance 
company; but it furnishes no warrant for avoiding 
hard consequences by importing into a contract an 
ambiguity which otherwise would not exist, or, un-
der the guise of construction by forcing from plain 
words unusual or unnatural meanings * :~o )!·." 
It is submitted that Bullock's first proposition is with-
out merit because Bullock has not pointed out any ambi-
guous or uncertain language in the agreement. Furthermore, 
a party who participates actively in the preparation and 
drafting of an agreement to which he is a party may not 
invoke the rule for his own benefit to relieve himself from 
the consequences of a contract which he would like to 
repudiate after it has been signed and accepted. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE APPLICATION 
OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRO·MISSO·RY ESTOPPEL IN 
THIS CASE. 
Bullock places his main reliance for reversal of the 
lower court upon the claim of estoppel. At the outset, in 
connection with this contention, he also admits that the 
agreement is entirely lacking in giving to him by express 
terms a contract of employment for eight years. The 
ground of the alleged estoppel is that he gave up other em-
ployment in order to accept a position with Deseret and 
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moved his family from Dallas to Salt Lake City upon a 
promise that he would be employed by Deseret for at least 
eight years and hence it would be a fraud to permit Deseret 
to discharge him without liability for the alleged damages 
he has suffered as a consequence. The authorities and text 
writers cited by Bullock all say that it is not unusual for an 
employment contract to be silent upon the period of time 
for which the employment is to endure. Thus, Corbin ort 
Contracts, Section 684, page 685, says: 
tr.::- :r- :r- Neither party may have any definite 
period of service in mind; in which case it is nat-
ural for them to say nothing about it, and the em-
ployment is terminable at the will of either 
party ::- ::- ::-." 
Corbin then goes on to say that the exception to the ex-
ception of the general rule that the statute of frauds may 
not be pleaded as a defense to an oral contract rests upon 
negligence or the intentional misleading of one of the parties 
by the other in which case an estoppel may be applicable. 
In Restate1nent of Agency 2, Section 442, it is likewise 
stated that mutual promises to employ and serve unless 
otherwise agreed are terminable upon notice by either party 
and further that if no time is specified and no considera-
tion is given for entering into the relationship other than 
a promise in general terms to employ or serve, may run 
only so long as either party wishes. If, however, the prin-
cipal re.ceives from the agent a promise other than a promise 
to serve, the promise to employ may be interpreted to extend 
for a period of time which is reasonable in view of the pur-
poses of the party who gives the consideration. An example 
of such consideration is cited as where in the sale of a busi-
ness, a promise is made to the former owner that he shall 
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continue to be employed in the business in which case such 
a promise may be interpreted to employ the former owner 
for a reasonable time. The authority, however, continues 
and says that if the contract is unilateral, so that the prin-
cipal receives nothing for his promise to employ other than 
the employee's promise to serve, such employment may prop-
erly be terminated by either party at will. 
Counsel places great reliance upon Ravarino vs. Price, 
123 Utah 559, 260 P2 570, in which case this court care-
fully considered the doctrine of promissory estoppel and 
refused to apply it to the facts of that case. Briefly stated, 
the facts claimed by the plaintiff were that he purchased a 
piece of real estate which he otherwise would not have pur-
chased except for the defendant's promise that defendant 
would sell a parcel of real estate which he owned to the 
plaintiff which was adjacent to the tract which the plaintiff 
bought. The agreement was not signed by the defendant and 
the statute of frauds was set up as a defense and this 
defense was held by this court to be applicable. In deciding 
that case this court referred to Papanikolas vs. Sampson, 73 
Utah 404, 274 P 856, where this court said: 
~~- ~~- ~· ccnor as a general rule can fraud be predi-
cated upon the failure to perform a promise or con-
tract which is unenforceable under the Statute of 
Frauds, since in such case the promisor has not, in a 
legal sense, made a contract, and hence has the 
right, both in law and equity, to refuse to perform." 
In that case also, this court quoted from Price vs. 
Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P 767 as follows: 
ucourts of equity, in establishing the doctrine 
invoked by plaintiff, have not, by any means, in-
tended to annul the statute of frauds, but only to 
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prevent its being made the means of perpetrating a 
fraud. In order that a plaintiff may be permitted to 
give evidence of a contract not in writing and which 
is in the very teeth of the statute and a nullity at 
law, it is essential that he establish (in equity), by 
cleat and positive proof, acts and things done in pur-
suance and on account thereof, exclusively referrable 
thereto and which take it out of the operation of the 
statute." 
Bullock cites two cases, in both of which an estoppel 
was applied or the rules were stated under which it might be 
invoked. The first of these cases is Seymour vs. Oelrichs, 
California 106 P 88. In that case plaintiff, a Police Captain 
in San Francisco, was persuaded to give up his position on 
the San Francisco Police Force to go and work for the de-
fendants upon the promise that if he would do so, he would 
receive a contract of employment for ten years and upon 
his representation that he could not afford to quit his job 
unless he was granted employment for such a period of 
time. Another fact of great importance in that case was 
that the plaintiff had a lifetime position with a pension 
awaiting him upon retirement about which the defendants 
knew. Acting upon the promise that an agreement would 
be written employing him for ten years, the plaintiff re-
signed and started to work for the defendants. When he 
requested that the agreement be reduced to writing, he 
was told by Mr. Fair, who had hired him, that Mr. Fair 
was too busy to have the writing prepared, but would 
do so as soon as he returned from a trip to Europe. Resting 
upon the security of these assurances the plaintiff commenced 
his employment with the defendant. Mr. Fair was killed 
and the agreement was never reduced to writing and after 
a couple of years the plaintiff was discharged. The Califor-
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nia court, in deciding this ·Case, held that an estoppel would 
apply to prevent the defendants from pleading the statute 
of frauds as a defense if plaintiff could establish agency be-
tween Mr. Fair and defendants. 
The other case cited by Bullock is Alaska Air Lines, Inc. 
vs. Stephenson, C. C. A. 9, 217 Fed. 2 295. In that case 
plaintiff was hired to be general manager of the defendant 
airline company and moved from California to Alaska. He 
claimed that when he was hired, he was promised that he 
would receive a two-year employment contract in writing, 
which would be presented to him within six weeks to three 
months after he commenced work. Plaintiff was entitled to 
a six months leave of absence from Western Airlines, which 
he took. When the six months leave of absence was about to 
expire, he renewed his effort to have his employment contract 
reduced to writing, to no avail. After his leave of absence 
with Western Air had expired, defendant discharged the 
plaintiff, who sued for loss of wages and other damages as a 
result of his discharge. The court in that case very reluctantly 
allowed plaintiff to recover. 
Bearing in mind the fact that promissory estoppel may 
be invoked under proper circumstances, the question still 
remains as to whether the undisputed facts in this case mea-
sure up to the requirements of the rule and to those facts in 
the cases where this rule has been applied. We submit that this 
record falls far short of the cases cited by appellant or the 
text writers upon which he relies. 
The chronology of evidence in this case is interesting and 
important. Long before December 13, 1957, negotiations had 
been going on between Bullock and the other incorporators of 
Deseret. These negotiations resulted in the execution of a con-
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tract between the parties on that date, after it had been modi-
fied and changed to meet Bullock's objections thereto. This 
agreement was primarily a stock option agreement but did 
contain references to appellant's employment as General 
Manager. (Exhibit uA"). Bullock took the position then, as 
he does now, that this instrument was an employment con-
tract as well as a stock option agreement. He accepted the 
agreement as embodying employment provisions without any 
objections after reading and fully understanding its provi-
sions. He commenced working for Deseret on January 8, 
1958. (Dep. 6; R. 39 and 40). 
A copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Deseret are 
in this record. (R. 56-65). The time of the execution of these 
articles does not appear in this record. However, the files in 
the Secretary of State's Office show that the articles were not 
executed until December 26, 1957 and were filed on Decem-
ber 30, 1957. Under these articles Bullock was an incorpora-
tor, was one of the six directors and vice-president. Bullock 
assumed and discharged these offices as well as that of general 
manager of the corporation for approximately a full year. 
Bullock asserts in his brief that he would not have terminated 
his employment with Chrysler until given assurance that he 
would have an employment contract.There is nothing in the 
pleadings or in any of the other parts of this record which 
support this contention. Not even the affidavits in the record 
make this assertion. The complaint alleges that Bullock had 
an employment contract, which he attaches as Exhibit HA" 
to his complaint and which he says Deseret breached. There is 
no allegation in the complaint that he was promised a written 
contract which Deseret refused to honor after he was em-
ployed or that he would not have quit a job to become con-
ne.cted with Deseret without such a contract in writing. His 
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affidavits merely allege that he relied upon Exhibit ccA" as an 
employment agreement for eight years. 
In none of the cases cited and relied upon by Bullock are 
the facts similar to this case. In those cases there was no con-
tract in writing at all, although the employee resigned other 
employment, relying upon a promise that a written contract 
would be forthcoming. In those cases there was a situation 
also where the employee had been induced or persuaded to 
leave his job. In this case, Bullock was the promotor and prin-
cipal figure in setting up a new and untried business and thus 
creating for himself a new business enterprise in which he had 
high anticipations of success. 
This court has had occasion to construe the case of Sey-
mour vs. Oelrich's, supra, in Ravarino vs. Price, supra, and 
also in Easton vs. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2, 386, 295 P2 332. In the 
Easton case we have all the elements present on which Bullock 
would rely for a reversal. 
In that case, which involved an oral promise to execute 
a written lease, the facts were that the defendant had prom-
ised to have a written lease drawn up which would satisfy 
the statute of frauds and upon the basis of this promise the 
plaintiff had moved his business from Trinidad, Colorado, to 
Utah and had entered into the premises where the lease was to 
be in effect with the knowledge of the defendant and there-
after, having moved into the premises, the defendant refused 
to execute a written lease, whereupon plaintiff sued for dam-
ages, claiming his inability to negotiate a favorable lease with 
the owner of the leased premises. The defendant pleaded the 
statute of frauds, and, as in this case, the plaintiff asserted 
that the defendant should be estopped from relying on the 
statute of frauds. It was held estoppel would not apply and 
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that the lower court had acted properly in granting the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment. In the course of 
the opinion in the Easton case, this court says: 
* :-'" :-'" ctthe mere refusal to execute a written con-
tract as agreed does not constitute (fraud' within the 
rule that the statute of frauds will not be enforced 
where the effect would be to perpetrate a fraud. 
::- * ::- and to hold otherwise, would, in effect, com-
pletely nullify the statute of frauds." 
In discussing the Oelrichs case, supra, this court pointed 
out that Seymour gave up a lifetime position in order to enter 
the defendant's service and also refers to the case of Morris 
Company vs. Mason, Okla. 39 P2 1 43 P2 401. The Morris 
case involved also a long term employment contract which 
was to be reduced to writing and this court says, in discussing 
that decision, that the position which the plaintiff gave up 
was one which was terminable by his former employer and 
that his moving was not occasioned by any promise of em-
ployment. These facts are strikingly similar to the case at bar. 
Bullock was working for Chrysler, but there was nothing 
which prevented Chrysler from discharging him. He had no 
lifetime contract and, as we have pointed out, Bullock would 
have been obliged to move anyway, because he had already 
been transferred by Chrysler to Atlanta, Georgia. This court 
refers also in that case to Albany Peanut Company vs. Euclid 
Candy Company, Calif. 85 P2 471, from which the following 
is quoted: 
((* , .. ::- The circumstances must clearly indicate 
that it would be a fraud for the party offering the 
inducements to assert the invalidity of a contract un-
der the statute and unless the words and conduct 
of the party sought to be held amount to an induce-
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ment to the other to waive a written contract in 
reliance upon the representation that the person prom-
ising will not avail himself of the statute of frauds 
there is an absence of fraud which is requisite to an 
estoppel. ~ ... * * a mere promise to execute a written 
contract followed by refusal to do so, is not sufficient 
to create an estoppel, even though reliance is placed 
upon such promise and damages occasioned by such 
refusal. The acts and conduct of the promisor must 
so clearly indicate that he did not intend to avail him-
self of the statute that to permit him to do so would 
be to work a fraud upon the other party * * ::- ." 
And, futhermore, this court stated the following in the 
Easton case: 
((If an action sounding in tort were allowed in 
every instance where the contract was unenforceable 
because not in writing and barred by the statute of 
frauds, the statute would be rendered meaningless." 
We submit that this record is. entirely lacking in even a 
suggestion that Bullock was given to understand that Deseret 
would not avail itself of the defense of the statute of frauds; 
that the principles announced by the Easton case must be 
applied and that there is no fraud present upon which an 
estoppel can be based upon the bare contention made by Bul-
lock that he was led to believe by the contract which was 
signed between the parties that he was being employed for 
at least eight years. 
Finally, if Exhibit ((A" is an employment contract, as 
Bullock asserts, there can be no promissory estoppel, because 
according to Bullock himself, Deseret did in fact give him a 
written contract of employment terminable at will. We sub-
mit that it is wholly inconsistent for Bullock to contend in 
one breath that the agreement he relies upon is an employ-
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ment contract legally sufficient to form the basis of his claim 
and to fully meet the requirements of the statute of frauds 
and in the next breath to assert that he was entitled to such a 
contract in writing and that Deseret's failure to perform this 
promise forms the basis of an estoppel to prevent the pleading 
of the statute of frauds. 
If the agreement which Bullock accepted after reading, 
and fully understanding it, did not contain the entire agree-
ment of the parties, Bullock had ample opportunity to object 
before it was signed and thus to have it corrected and to em-
body what he now asserts was the true agreement of the 
parties. He knew what was in this contract when it was 
signed and its language could not possibly have misled him to 
assume that he was employed for eight years. 
We submit that the record supports Deseret's contention 
that Exhibit ((A" reflected the entire and complete agreement 
of the parties and that there is no basis in this case for the 
principle of estoppel to be applied. 
Additionally, we desire to point out that if Bullock 
wished to rely upon estoppel in this case, it was his obligation 
and duty to plead the facts upon which the estoppel would be 
based. In Collett vs. Goodrich, supra, this court held in the 
following language that a party relying upon promissory 
estoppel must plead it: 
H:r- :.t. :,t. Where estoppel is not pleaded, it is in-
admissible :,t. :,t. ::- :,t. The object of the declaration is to 
give the defendant fair notice of the case he is called 
into court to meet :,t. :.t. :.t. under the circumstances of 
the instant case, the appellant need not anticipate 
what defenses were intended to be relied upon, with-
in the plea of general denial in order to affirmatively 
plead that respondent is estopped from relying upon 
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the statute of frauds '~ '~ '~ the statute of frauds is a 
defense which may be waived if the party desires to 
stand on the oral contract. It should be expressly and 
clearly invoked before a pleading of estoppel be re-
quired, in order to dispense with the necessity of 
producing a written contract or a written memoran-
dum thereof. But there was ample opportunity at the 
trial to amend and plead estoppel, after counsel for 
appellant were specifically apprised of respondent's 
reliance on the defense of the statute of frauds. No 
amendment was asked, nor did appellant's motion for 
a new trial mention estoppel. So far as the record 
shows, it appears initially in appellant's brief. 
Although .estoppel may be considered for the first 
time on appeal in some equity cases, Mason v. Ellison, 
63 Ariz. 196, 160 P2d 326, the majority view is that 
the question will not be considered by the appellate 
court without first having been properly presented 
to the trial court. Appellant should have requested 
permission to amend and plead estoppel or it should 
appear in the pre-trial order. Having failed to do so 
it is not properly presented for determination." 
In this case, after the filing of Deseret's amendment 
pleading the statute of frauds, Bullock made no attempt to 
amend to plead estoppel. This question is presented for the 
first time in Bullock's brief and is too late. The record shows 
Deseret's pleading of the statute of frauds was served on Bul-
lock on October 1, 1959. No reply to this amendment was 
ever filed. The motion for summary judgment was argued 
October 13, 1959. Both parties filed written memoranda with 
the lower court. At no place until the filing of his brief did 
Bullock give notice that he was intending to rely on estoppel 
to escape the operation of the statute of frauds. That he had 
ample opportunity prior to the filing of his brief to do so is 
clear. 
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POINT IV 
THE AGREEMENT RELIED UPON BY APPEL-
LANT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE RE-
QUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
What we have already said regarding the question of 
estoppel and the legal insufficiency of the agreement to 
satisfy the statute of frauds on the question of Bullock's em-
ployment for eight years largely disposes of appellant's next 
contention that this agreement was in law sufficient and 
hence is not subject to the statute of frauds. 
Under Bullock's third point, he again concedes that the 
agreement made no provision for a definite emplonnent 
term. On the basis of this admission, we can only reiterate 
that which we have already said, viz., that where an employee 
relies upon a definite agreement to employ for a term of 
years, this provision being one of the essential terms of such a 
contract, must be in writing, notwithstanding Bullock's con-
tentions to the contary. Bullock, in order to escape the com-
mon requirements of the statute, attempts to use the stock 
option provisions of the agreement to supply the necessary 
writing to support an agreement to employ him for at least 
eight years. He dismisses as insignificant the language of 
Article 3 of this contract which expressly says that the option 
to purchase stock must be exercised during his employment. 
We submit that this is an untenable position in the face of 
the rule which declares that the language of a written agree-
ment must all be considered in seeking to determine the inten-
tion of the parties. 
One of the prime purposes of stock option agreements 
in favor of employees is to offer them an incentive to remain 
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with the organization which grants it. It was therefore most 
natural for this agreement to provide that the stock options 
should only be exercised during Bullock's employment. It 
could hardly be expected that such an option would run in 
perpetuity and hence a time limit was provided during which 
Bullock, though employed, was required to make up his mind 
if he wanted to buy the stock covered by the option. It was 
made plain by language of the agreement that these options 
must be exercised not later than eight years after the date of 
the agreement. There is nothing in the agreement to support 
Bullock's contention that Deseret solely and acting alone 
chose eight years as the outside limit of exercising the options 
-this was a provision mutually agreed upon. It is. a non se-
quitur for Bullock to argue that because his agreement gave 
him eight years to purchase stock, if his employment con-
tinued that long, that this privilege constituted any assurance 
or promise that he was to be employed for that period of 
time. Bullock likewise argues that the second option, which 
provided for the purchase of stock in the event the Hinckleys 
desired to sell, gave to Bullock the right to purchase from 
Hinckleys regardless of whether he was employed at the time 
the stock was offered for sale. We submit that such con-
struction is unreasonable and in contradiction of Article 3 of 
the contract, which limited his right to purchase stock to the 
time when he was still employed. The plain meaning of the 
contract is that Bullock's right to purchase stock was to be 
exercised during employment and not afterwards. 
Bullock relies upon the case of Magness vs. Madden, Ark. 
207 SW2, 714, for the proposition that where an employee is 
given a right to buy an interest in a business which he may 
exercise for a definite period of time, such fact is evidence of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
an intention that the employee is to be employed for a period 
coextensive with his right to acquire such an interest. That 
case is not authority for the case presented by this record. 
First, because, as counsel points out, the business involved was 
a partnership and did not involve a stock option and secondly, 
because in that case there is no limitation upon the employee's 
right to buy an interest in the business for five years. In this 
case, on the other hand, the agreement gives no such unquali-
fied right, but expressly limits the right to the period of ac-
tual employment. Furthermore, we submit that the Madden 
case is directly contrary to the Utah decisions which hold that 
every essential element of a contract not to be performed in 
one year must be in writing. Furthermore, there is no merit 
to the contention made that Bullock paid consideration for 
his employment in addition to his promise to serve. The rec-
ord shows absolutely no other promise made by Bullock than 
that he would work for Deseret. 
As we pointed out in Restatement of Agency, Section 
442 (c) , supra, an employment contract is unilateral if no 
consideration is given by the employee. Bullock made no 
promise to work for eight or any other number of years. He 
was free to quit or resign at any time, nor was he obligated to 
buy any stock. The only thing in the way of additional con-
sideration to which Bullock can point is that he gave up an-
other job and moved his family. We have already pointed out 
the reasons why this cannot be considered a consideration to 
support a promise of a definite term of employment. Aside 
from the fact that Bullock quit a job and moved to Salt Lake 
this case is no different than any other case in which an em-
ployee, in order to accept a new job, must necessarily resign 
from his old position. 
There is no element of inequity or unfairness established 
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by a showing that an employee has quit a job or moved his 
family, standing alone, to justify setting aside the statute of 
frauds. The authorities cited by Bullock hold that much more 
must be involved. We return once more to the unquestioned 
facts of this case that there was no inducement by Deseret 
which prompted Bullock to quit Chrysler. This he proposed 
doing himself. All of the facts established that he was eager 
to do so and nothing appears in the record to support his con-
tention that he would not have quit Chrysler without an 
eight-year contract. We submit further that Bullock's posi-
tion is unreasonable when it is considered that Deseret had 
not even been incorporated when the· agreement was signed; 
that it was a new and untried business; that no one could 
possibly foretell or guarantee that it would be successful. 
Under these circumstances to say that Bullock was to be 
guaranteed eight years of employment, regardless of what 
happened and without any corresponding obligation on him 
to continue the employment is putting a strain upon cre-
dulity. 
Bullock states that the reason he was offered another 
job with Hinckleys was because Deseret did not dare to dis-
charge him because it well knew and understood that the 
contract is much different than Deseret now argues it to be. 
This is a gratuitous statement wholly unsupported by any 
evidence in the record. 
The last proposition argued by Bullock under point four 
is that the offer of another job by Hinckleys at a salary as 
good as the one paid by Deseret would not cast upon him the 
duty of acceptance in mitigation of his damage. There is no 
attempt, however, to deny that Bullock was actully offered 
such employment at as good a salary as the one previously en-
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joyed, and there is nothing in the record to support the prop-
osition that the offer was conditioned upon Bullock surren-
dering or giving up any contractual rights. He chose not to 
accept this offer and the record is therefore conclusive that 
he did not desire to mitigate his loss and voluntarily accepted 
other employment for less compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, 
because an essential part of the alleged agreement upon which 
appellant relies was not in writing and hence appellant is 
barred from recovery by the statute of frauds. There is no 
basis in the facts and circumstances for an estoppel nor was 
estoppel ever pleaded. The agreement between the parties is 
not ambiguous in its terms so as to permit the admission of 
parol evidence to explain any doubtful or ambiguous provi-
sion. The agreement was signed and accepted by both parties 
and especially by Bullock after his active participation in its 
drafting and preparation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
and ALBERT R. BOWEN 
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